If MintID one day scales to a public, permissionless network, that network’s design includes a native token with a maximum supply fixed at exactly 108,000,000. No such token exists today, and MintID does not need one: it runs on the single-node production chain, which is permissioned and where nothing can be bought. In that design, the token makes the network expensive to attack and cheap to trust: validators bond it to secure consensus, issuers lock it as collateral for good behaviour, and the flows that grow with adoption carry a protocol cut whose allocation is a governed parameter under review. Its job is to pay for security, and no amount of it ever buys access to anyone’s identity.
the flows
No MintID token is issued, offered or admitted to trading. Today MintID runs on the single-node production chain, in production since 20 September 2026 and operated by the CONECTIA group — a permissioned chain where security is key custody, not stake, and whose unit of account has no value and is never carried over to a public network. That chain serves the current issuers, verifiers and pilots without any token. Everything on this page describes one way MintID could scale later — a public, permissionless network that pays for its own security — if that route is chosen at the Gate-1 go/no-go, and only through the full EU MiCA Title II process.
The maximum supply is 108,000,000 tokens, counted against everything ever minted. New tokens come only from the validator reward pool, on a public, strictly declining curve that must exhaust the pool exactly. The prior is 3% of the cap in year one — 3.24 million tokens — declining by a factor of 0.95 each year: about 40% of the pool in ten years, and 79% within thirty.
Each epoch’s new tokens would go to the validators who did the work, weighted by stake and by how reliably they signed. A validator that misses blocks would earn less, and one that cheats would lose its stake. Nobody is paid for judging identities: validators never see one.
Issuers pay admission, renewal and registry-lease fees. Agent credentials pay a mint fee and a recurring lease, and consented disclosures pay a protocol cut too. Each cut, and how it is allocated, is a governed parameter whose final form is under review.
The cap is frozen. Everything else is a ratified band, inside which only governance can move a value, or a prior — an argued working point that the independent pre-genesis simulation validates or argues against. No price appears anywhere on this site.
The genesis allocation is ratified as bands — development and team 15%, public-sale tranche 20–25%, reward pool at least 60% — with priors of 15, 25 and 60%. The simulation fixes the final points inside the bands, and if it recommends a lower sale point, the difference returns to the reward pool.
16.2 million tokens at the prior, for developer compensation, operations, and ecosystem and tester grants, in labelled sub-accounts. Four-year continuous vesting with a one-year cliff and a twelve-month lock-up after genesis — and while those apply, the accounts may not delegate or vote, and they do not count toward the launch-security gate.
27 million tokens at the prior: the tranche that would finance a launch if the public route is chosen, offered only through the full EU MiCA Title II process, at a single fixed price and with a raise floor of $4.0 M net. Nothing is for sale today.
64.8 million tokens at the prior, reserved for one thing only: paying the validators who secure the chain, on a strictly declining emission. When the pool runs out, the security budget is the fee market, backed by a committed succession ladder — and minting beyond the cap is excluded by construction.
One genesis event, and no discretionary mint after it. A Genesis Allocation Statement will list every genesis address with its label, percentage, vesting and custody, and its hash will be committed in the genesis file so that anyone can reconcile block 1 against it. Treasury and grants accounts sit behind a multisig with an independent co-signer and a timelock.
These bands, and the mechanism behind every flow on this page, were examined by an economic-viability review in July 2026, performed by Conectia PRO — a related-party service provider, not an arm’s-length third party, as the report’s cover discloses. The report is published in full. The independent economic review, the only arm’s-length opinion, is still ahead. Read the findings
Everything a public network would earn fits in five flows. Only two carry protocol cuts, and a firewall keeps service revenue away from consensus rewards. Apart from the fixed cap, every number is a band or a prior until the simulation fixes it.
Each agent credential pays a mint fee and a recurring lease on a governed schedule. The protocol takes a cut — a governed parameter under review. It is the one protocol revenue line that grows with the agent population; presentations stay free.
KYC organisations pay admission, renewal and an active-registry lease — governed parameters — and post a slashable bond without which they cannot operate. Slashes fund remediation for the parties harmed.
When a relying party pays to identify an agent and the principal consents, the bid goes to the principal, the issuer may earn a brokerage fee, and the protocol takes a cut — a percentage plus a fixed floor per disclosure — collected on aggregate settlement. A refusal costs nothing and pays nothing. The consented commercial disclosure rail is built and ships switched off and fail-closed; its activation waits for counsel.
Claim bonds, slashable dispute bonds, and arbiter fees paid by the losing party. This is off-chain service revenue for arbiters, and it must never influence consensus rewards. The dispute rail is specified and scheduled for the financial-recourse stage.
Basic verification is free by design: off-chain, against public state, with no per-check fee. What can be paid for is the premium layer around it — mirrors, archives, managed services — and those fees never touch consensus. No usage tax exists or is planned.
The figures the Protocol Whitepaper v1.0 publishes, and the status of each one.
| Value | Status | Figure |
|---|---|---|
| Maximum supply | Frozen | 108,000,000 tokens, exact |
| Genesis allocation — development / public sale / reward pool | Bands 15 / 20–25 / ≥ 60% | Priors 15 / 25 / 60% |
| Emission curve | Rule: exhausts the reward pool exactly; strictly declining | Prior 3% of the cap in year one, ×0.95 per year |
| Protocol cut on agent mint and lease | Governed parameter | Under review |
| Allocation of each protocol cut | Governed parameters | Final form under review |
| Genesis active set · voting-power cap · unbonding | Priors | 60 (toward 100 by governance) · 5% · 21 days |
| Launch-gate thresholds | Priors | ≥ 20% of supply externally bonded · ≥ 25 independent operators · Nakamoto coefficient ≥ 7 |
| Raise floor (public-offer route only) | Ratified invariant | $4.0 M net of statutory withdrawals |
| Offer price, if an offer is ever made | Ratified mechanism | One fixed price, no tiers — the figure appears only in the MiCA white paper |
| Vesting · lock-up | Policy | Four years with a one-year cliff · 12 months; no delegation or vote while they apply |
| Status freshness · presentation lifetime | Governed · constant | 30 s heartbeat, 45 s maximum age (reference value; 180 s on the single-node production chain), fail closed · 10 s, single use |
Frozen means fixed for good. A band binds; a prior is an argued working point, validated or argued against by the independent simulation before genesis.
One human verification carries across every agent that human deploys. Machine identities already outnumber human ones by roughly 50 to 1 (Omdia, December 2024). In a per-check world, every agent of every person pays for verification again at every counterparty. Here, one KYC backs many agent credentials, each paying only its mint and lease — and every presentation is free for everyone.
Every market figure on this site carries a primary source — see where the numbers come from.
On a public network, the token would be the economic-security asset: each use below puts value at stake against misbehaviour.
Validators would bond tokens to run consensus, and delegators could back them and share in their rewards. The more value staked, the more an attack costs.
On a public network, every KYC organisation allowed to issue credentials would lock a native-token bond, and the chain would not activate an issuer without one. Proven fraud or negligence is slashed through an evidence-backed council process, and a slash that exhausts the bond suspends the issuer at once. The bond is sized against a published deterrence target, above the gain from the cheapest slashable violation. Each slash funds a remediation share for the parties harmed; the allocation of the rest is a governed parameter under review, and the body that adjudicates can never profit from it.
Transaction fees, registry leases and status-publication fees would keep a public network running; they are governed parameters. The system does not depend on end users transacting constantly to sustain itself.
On a public network, software governance would run through the token: protocol upgrades and versioned parameters are decided by token-weighted on-chain voting, alongside an operational compliance council, once it is seated, whose reserve actions always require an independent custodian’s co-signature.
Each boundary below is written into the specifications, and each one closes a way the token could be misused.
No payment — token, bid or bond — is ever the lawful basis for revealing who someone is. Commercial disclosure requires the person’s consent; dispute disclosure requires due process. Money alone never unlocks identity.
The recourse behind AI agents does not depend on the native token. The capital is the principal’s own USDC or EURC, locked in a contract the principal controls on the chain where the stablecoin lives (Base in the current deployment variant). MintID runs no general smart-contract VM: it keeps the reservation state and checks a proof of the lock. Specified, scheduled; not built. No funds are locked today. No fiat custodian, no third-party deposit, and no anonymity-enhanced coin in any collateral set.
A small, separate BTC reserve would exist only for proven issuer-fraud remediation and critical security incidents. It is not token backing, not a bridge, not escrow collateral and not a price-support fund — moving it takes the council plus an independent custodian, an on-chain commitment, a reason code, a timelock and a public report.
No dividends, no distributions, no backing, no price support. The protocol cut on agent flows and its allocation are governed parameters under review, and whatever share of protocol cuts the Foundation receives is earmarked and never paid out to token holders.
The native token never supports shielded or anonymity-enhanced transfers — a protocol invariant of the same rank as the hard cap. MintID’s privacy protects identities, not payments: the token’s value flows stay transparent and auditable end to end.
A payment for consent. It goes to the principal if they accept; nothing happens if they refuse; it is never slashed. On the commercial rail the basis for any disclosure is the principal’s consent.
Slashable stake: it deters frivolous claims and is adjudicated. On the dispute rail the basis is due process, never money.
The two never mix — and no payment of either kind is ever a lawful basis for revealing someone’s identity.
In the public-network design, consensus rewards and service revenue are firewalled from each other: securing blocks would be paid in new tokens, while identity services are paid in ordinary fees that can never influence consensus.
Earn the declining epoch emission, split by stake and signing performance, plus transaction fees. Validators charge a declared commission on delegated rewards.
Pay admission, renewal and registry leases, and earn off-chain by charging for KYC and credential issuance. The locked bond is what they stand to lose.
Earn direct service fees off-chain — managed verification services, status mirrors and archives, and arbitration fees paid by the losing side of a dispute. Never consensus rewards.
Dormant until the public-offer route is chosen. On that route it would receive a share of protocol cuts, earmarked first for the validator operator floor program and then for its own operations, under a public annual report. It has no other revenue role.
The hard cap and the declining emission are normative requirements; the maximum supply is exactly 108,000,000 tokens and immutable. The allocation is ratified as bands with published priors — 15% development, 25% public sale, 60% reward pool — and the independent simulation validates each prior or argues against it before genesis. Many token models quote a maximum supply their own emission can never reach; MintID closes that gap by rule, so the cap is the real denominator of every figure published.
One thing stays visible on this page on purpose: nothing is for sale. No sale, no pre-sale, no whitelist, no price, no date. There is exactly one route by which an offer could ever exist — the full EU MiCA Title II process: a crypto-asset white paper, notification to the AFM (the Dutch authority, competent through the Foundation’s seat), a public offer at a single fixed price, and only then admission to trading. Every other offer term will appear only in that white paper. Until then, anything that looks like a MintID sale is not us.
Every market figure on this site carries a primary source — see where the numbers come from.