An agent credential is minted for one AI agent from one person’s verified identity. The agent carries it and, when a service asks, proves in zero knowledge that a KYC-verified, accountable person stands behind it, within the scope that person set, without naming the person. The service runs the check in its own infrastructure and keeps a minimal decision record: never the proof, never the person.
RUNRun it
pip install "mintid-agent[ed25519]"
Python 3.12 or later; the extra is the software Web Bot Auth signer, not needed with your own. The package carries the endpoints of each network profile: MINTID_NETWORK=testnet points it at the public testnet, where a sandbox issuer mints agent credentials for free against your own verifier. TypeScript and Go clients drive the same holder binary.
PROOFWhat it proves, and what it does not
Proves
- A KYC-verified, accountable person backs the agent, at a stated assurance grade; the service learns the answer, never the person.
- The agent acts within the scope fixed when it was minted, provable part by part; an out-of-scope request is refused by name.
- The credential is live: not revoked by the person, the operator or the issuer, and not past its lease, as of a fresh status root.
Does not prove
- Not what the agent ran: which configuration it started with, where it ran, which calls it made. That is provenance, a different layer: glossary
- Not who the person is, and no attribute beyond the claim the service asked for.
- Not that the operator is honest: a managed runtime is a signal to weigh, never a root of trust.
EVIDENCEEvidence
Every claim of status on this page points at something public you can open or reproduce.