The chain holds trust records and status roots, never identities: who the accepted issuers and verifiers are, their keys and bonds, and a signed root per issuer at least every 30 seconds. A revocation, the issuer’s or the holder’s own, enters the next root and is refused by every verifier within the maximum root age; the person or the operator switches an agent off without asking the issuer and without telling the network which credential died.
RUNRun it
pip install mintid-proof-core
The proof core as Python bindings: a prebuilt wheel for Linux x86-64, elsewhere pip builds it with a Rust toolchain. To watch the kill switch against a running deployment, run the revocation trace from a clone of the main project: uv run python test-harness/trace/revocation_trace.py --target testnet.
PROOFWhat it proves, and what it does not
Proves
- That a presentation was made against a finalised status root the verifier itself checked, through proven chain reads rather than a trusted node.
- That a revoked credential is refused everywhere within the maximum root age plus clock tolerance, 185 seconds at the deployed values, and at once after an emergency root; the revocation trace times it.
- That the chain records only roots and trust records: no identity, no KYC evidence, no presentation, no log of who checked whom.
Does not prove
- Not what the agent ran: which configuration it started with, where it ran, which calls it made. That is provenance, a different layer: glossary
- Not who anyone is: a status root reveals nothing about which credential died, and the chain holds no personal data to leak or subpoena.
- Not an audited core: no independent audit of this implementation has been completed; each one is a scheduled milestone whose findings are published.
EVIDENCEEvidence
Every claim of status on this page points at something public you can open or reproduce.