> The MintID token in plain language: a hard cap, declining issuance, protocol burns, staking and issuer bonds. It secures the network — never buys identity. Token economics # A scarce token that pays for security MintID has its own native token with a fixed maximum supply of 108,000,000 tokens — like Bitcoin, the cap is absolute. It exists to make the network expensive to attack and cheap to trust: validators lock it to secure consensus, issuers lock it as collateral for good behaviour, and the businesses that profit from trust pay fees — part of which are destroyed. One thing it never does: buy access to anyone’s identity. the flows 108 mhard capstakebondfeesburn · ∅ [Read the whitepaper](/en/whitepaper)[See the roadmap](/en/roadmap) In one minute ## How the money works 01 ### The supply is capped A hard maximum supply is fixed — 108,000,000 tokens — written into the protocol. New tokens are created on a public, strictly declining schedule — the argued point: 3% of the cap in year one, declining by 5% each year — and the schedule is a completeness rule: the curve sums exactly to the validator reward pool, so every token the cap promises can actually exist. 02 ### Validators earn the new tokens Each epoch’s new tokens go to the validators who actually did the work — weighted by how much they have at stake and how reliably they signed. Miss blocks and you earn less; cheat and you lose your stake. Nobody is paid for judging identities: validators never see one. 03 ### Businesses pay, and part is burned The organisations that profit from the network — KYC issuers above all — pay admission fees, renewal fees and ongoing registry leases. A defined part of those fees, and of any penalties, is destroyed; the protocol’s cut follows an argued split of 30% burned, 45% directed to validators and 25% to the foundation — earmarked first for its validator operator floor program. Demand for trust removes tokens from circulation. 04 ### Supply can shrink — no promises When burns exceed new issuance in a period, total supply falls. And burning is one-way: burned tokens never re-open room to mint, because the cap counts everything ever issued — not what circulates. The protocol makes that possible by design, but deliberately promises no perpetual deflation — sound security is never sacrificed to force a chart to go down. Bands are ratified and frozen; the points shown are our argued working points inside those bands, and the independent economic simulation validates every one of them before genesis. Genesis allocation ## Three compartments, argued points in ratified bands The genesis allocation is ratified as bands — a hard envelope committed in writing, in public — and inside those bands the working points are now published: development 15%, public tranche 25%, validator reward pool 60%. Argued points, not guesses: the independent economic simulation validates every one of them before genesis. 15% ### Development & team Natively vested on-chain over four years with a one-year cliff, plus a twelve-month lock-up on top — and a rule most projects avoid writing down: insider genesis accounts may not delegate, may not vote, and do not count toward the launch-security gate. 25% ### Public tranche The tranche that finances the launch — offered, if ever, only through the complete EU MiCA Title II process, with a published budget annex mapping the entire launch cost stack to it, through mainnet plus twelve months. Nothing is for sale today. 60% ### Validator emission pool Sixty percent of the hard cap — the argued point inside a ratified ≥60% band — is reserved for one thing only: paying the validators who secure the chain, on a strictly declining emission with no re-mint. And when emission eventually runs out, the written answer is a modelled post-emission fee market — none of its successor options is printing more tokens. The vesting, the cliff, the lock-up and the no-delegation/no-vote rule are protocol policy, not promises. Bands are ratified and frozen; the points shown are our argued working points inside those bands, and the independent economic simulation validates every one of them before genesis. The cap needs no simulation: 108,000,000 is immutable. These bands — and the mechanism behind every flow on this page — were examined by an economic-viability audit (July 2026), performed by Conectia PRO — a related-party service provider to the protocol, not an arm’s-length third party, disclosed on the report’s cover — with the verdict, stated whole, and the complete register of critical findings published on this site. [Read the findings](/en/blog/we-audited-ourselves) Economics ## Five flows, one structure Everything the network earns fits in five flows. This is the canonical structure — the same one used with partners and reviewers. The mechanism of each flow is committed in the specifications; apart from the fixed maximum supply, the numbers are versioned parameters — band ranges committed before genesis, final points set by the independent economic simulation. LEASE ### Agent mint + lease Each agent credential pays a mint fee when issued and a small recurring lease while it lives, with a normative, non-zero protocol cut, partially burned. Costs scale with the agent population — never with how often agents prove things, because presentations are free by construction. ISSUER ### Issuer economics KYC organisations pay registry admission and renewal, and post a slashable bond without which they cannot operate — misbehaviour is expensive and undercollateralization is self-suspending. Issuers charge their own KYC and issuance fees to their clients — so recruiting one issuer brings its entire portfolio onto the rail. BID ### Disclosure brokerage When a relying party pays to identify an agent, the disclosure bid is paid to the principal — the person whose privacy is at stake — while the issuer earns a brokerage fee for operating the consent machinery, and a normative, non-zero protocol cut is partially burned. Identification becomes a metered, priced event with the privacy-holder collecting. ARBITER ### Dispute & arbiter market Disputes run on slashable bonds and a paid, registered arbiter market, with the accumulated cost borne by the eventual loser. These fees sustain the ecosystem roles as off-chain service revenue — never as consensus rewards, which stay reserved for validators. SVC ### Premium verification services Verifying is free by construction: stateless, off-chain, no per-check fee. What is paid is the premium layer around it — mirrors, archives, SLAs and dashboards — as optional services on top of a free public rail. Why it compounds ## One KYC, every agent One human verification amortises across every agent that human deploys. Machine identities already outnumber human ones roughly 50 to 1 (Omdia, Dec 2024). In a per-check world, every agent of every human re-pays verification at every counterparty. Here, one KYC backs N agent credentials at the marginal cost of a mint and a lease — orders of magnitude below a KYC — and every presentation is free for everyone. The marginal cost of accountability per agent tends toward the mint cost, not the KYC cost. Every market figure on this site carries a primary source — see [where the numbers come from](/en/sources). ## What the token is for The native token is the economic security asset of the chain. Every use ties value to honest behaviour. STAKE ### Staking & delegation Validators bond tokens to run consensus, and anyone can delegate to them and share the rewards. The more value honestly staked, the more expensive an attack becomes. BOND ### Issuer bonds Every KYC organisation allowed to issue credentials locks a token bond as collateral — and cannot be active without it: the requirement is enforced by consensus, not by policy. Proven fraud or negligence gets it slashed through a documented, evidence-committed process, and if the collateral falls below the protocol minimum the issuer is suspended automatically — vouching for people has skin in the game, verifiably. Slashed collateral has only two destinations: compensation for the parties an issuer harmed, or the burn address. It can never fund operations — the body that adjudicates sanctions cannot profit from them, and that rule is enforced by construction, not by promise. BURN ### Fees, leases & burns Transaction fees, issuer registry leases and status-publication fees keep the network running — and defined portions are burned. The system does not depend on end users transacting constantly to sustain itself. VOTE ### Governance weight Software governance runs through the token: protocol upgrades and versioned parameters are decided by token-weighted on-chain voting, alongside an operational compliance council whose reserve actions always require an independent custodian’s co-signature. Deliberate boundaries ## What the token is not Some of the strongest design decisions are refusals. These boundaries are written into the specifications. ∅ ### Not a key to identities No payment — token, bid or bond — is ever the lawful basis for revealing who someone is. Commercial disclosure requires the person’s consent; dispute disclosure requires due process. Money alone never unlocks identity. € ### Not the dispute escrow The recourse funds behind AI agents are held in USDC or EURC stablecoins, self-custodied in the owner’s wallet under a smart-contract lock — so compensation is stable and predictable, insulated from token volatility. The committed collateral set is USDC/EURC at launch, extending to BTC — each asset added through the protocol’s collateral registry, with per-asset over-collateralization, never by weakening the escrow guarantees. ₿ ### Not backed by the reserve A small, separate BTC treasury exists only for proven issuer-fraud remediation and critical security incidents. It is not token backing, not escrow collateral (the escrow collateral rails are a separate, registry-governed mechanism) and not a price-support fund — moving it requires the council plus an independent custodian, with a timelock and a public report. ✕ ### Not a DeFi playground No lending, no wrapped collateral, no stablecoin backing, no token-price support, no cross-chain bridges. The token does one job — economic security for an identity rail — and refuses the rest. ⊘ ### Not a privacy coin The native token never supports shielded or anonymity-enhanced transfers — a protocol invariant of the same rank as the hard cap. MintID’s privacy protects identities, not payments: the token’s value flows stay transparent and auditable end to end. Two payments, two rails ## A bid is not a bond BID ### Disclosure bid A payment for consent. It goes to the principal if they accept; nothing happens if they refuse; it is never slashed. On the commercial rail the basis for any disclosure is the principal’s consent. BOND ### Dispute bond Slashable stake: it deters frivolous claims and is adjudicated. On the dispute rail the basis is due process, never money. The two never mix — and no payment of either kind is ever a lawful basis for revealing someone’s identity. Incentives ## Who earns what Consensus rewards and service revenue are firewalled from each other: securing blocks is paid in new tokens, while identity services are paid in ordinary fees that can never influence consensus. ### Validators & delegators Earn the declining epoch emission, split by stake and signing performance, plus transaction fees. Validators charge a declared commission on delegated rewards. ### Issuers Pay to play — admission, renewal and registry leases — and earn off-chain by charging for KYC and credential issuance. Their locked bond is what they stand to lose. ### Verifiers & arbiters Earn direct service fees off-chain — verification services, status mirrors, proof APIs, and arbitration fees paid by the losing side of a dispute. Never consensus rewards. ## The mechanism is committed. The bands are frozen. The points are argued — and validated before genesis. The hard cap, the declining schedule and the burn mechanics are normative requirements of the protocol; the maximum supply is fixed at exactly 108,000,000 tokens — immutable. The genesis allocation is no longer an open question: the bands are ratified and frozen, and the points on this page — 15% development, 25% public tranche, 60% validator reward pool — are our argued working points inside those bands, with the independent economic simulation validating every one of them before genesis. Most token models quote a max supply their own emission schedule can never reach; MintID closed that gap by rule — the emission curve must sum to the reward pool exactly, so the 108M cap is not a marketing number but the real denominator of every figure we publish. The allocation will be published address-by-address, natively vested on-chain, custodied under multisig with an independent co-signer — and the whole economic design was put through a published economic-viability audit before genesis. One thing stays visible on this page on purpose: nothing is for sale. No token sale, no pre-sale, no whitelist, no price, no date. As a matter of ratified policy there is exactly one route by which an offer could ever exist — the complete EU MiCA Title II process: crypto-asset white paper, notification to the AFM — the Dutch regulator, fixed as the competent authority under MiCA by the foundation’s seat — public offer, and only then admission to trading. Until that day, anything that looks like a MintID sale is not us. Structure committed; bands ratified and frozen; argued points validated by the independent simulation before genesis. Fees remain versioned parameters gated on that simulation and on pilot calibration. Every market figure on this site carries a primary source — [see where the numbers come from](/en/sources). [Read the whitepaper](/en/whitepaper)[Get in touch](/en/contact) --- Source: https://mintid.net/en/tokenomics · Tokenomics — hard cap, staking, burns — MintID