



MintID



Verifying who an agent acts for at checkout

What a merchant can verify about the person behind an agent without learning who it is, and what happens when the delegation ends

MintID an open-source, KYC-backed identity layer for agents; the MintID Foundation, a Netherlands stichting, is being incorporated

ZadQ the first product built on MintID, an x402 seller-verification service

What the merchant needs to know

According to the Agentic Standards Map by Francesco Marinoni Moretto (v1.0, 14 October 2026), seam S3 "Agent identity and delegation" asks "how an agent shows who it acts for".

A name gives the merchant little

It can't check it, it must protect it, and it says nothing about this purchase.

Yes-or-no answers at checkout

Proved for this merchant and this request, and withdrawn within a stated time when the person ends the delegation.

Where the building blocks live

According to this WG's charter, "Identity & Trust WG owns agent and buyer identity primitives, delegation models, and credential formats. AC WG applies these to commerce flows". Here they are used at checkout, beside the payment.

What the merchant verifies without a name

One zero-knowledge proof answers every check; the merchant sees only yes or no.

1	A person stands behind it	KYC-verified, assurance grade A2 or above here; identity hidden
2	Delegated to pay this merchant	this merchant is in the scope the person delegated
3	This action	payments.initiate, in one category and one country
4	Within the person's limit	the basket is under the limit; the limit stays hidden
5	Still in force	unexpired and unrevoked, per the issuer's latest status on the chain

Each proof lives ten seconds, answers one request, and is bound to this merchant.

Recorded run on the public testnet

Recorded 23 October in the KYC sandbox. One credential covers one merchant, action, category and country, with a 250 USDC limit.



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|---|--|
| 1 Checkout, 60 USDC | accepted inside the 10-second window; about 16 kB of proof; the person stays unnamed |
| 2 The same proof again | refused, because a proof answers one request |
| 3 A basket of 400 USDC | the agent can't build the proof; an old 60 USDC proof is refused |
| 4 An action never delegated | refused at the agent and at the verifier |
| 5 Delegation withdrawn mid-session | the compliant agent stops; a copy is refused within the 185 s bound |

What the merchant keeps, and what stays private

Keeps

- yes-or-no answers, and a pseudonym valid at this merchant only
- the issuer status the proof rests on
- its own verifier's decision record, kept private

Never sent

- a name, a date of birth, a document
- the exact grade and the exact limit
- any link to other merchants or to the person's other agents

When the person withdraws the delegation

Revocation travels in the issuer's status on the chain, and the verifier reads it from there.

The compliant agent

stops at its next status check.

A copy nobody stopped

is accepted until the issuer's new status can be proven, then refused for good.

The bound

185 s on this deployment; every conforming verifier refuses by then.

Other paths

holder's own kill switch 245 s · person's own credential revoked 395 s · issuer emergency update one block

Current limits

What this run leaves uncovered

One operator	one validator, run by Conectia, which also runs the single-node production chain; test credentials only
One hop	no sub-delegation yet; a narrowing-only design is on file
Age	an age check without the date of birth is built; not offered yet
Recourse	funded recourse for disputes is specified and scheduled, not built
Payment	MintID sits beside the payment; the x402 binding is a draft, not yet proposed
Evidence	Round 1 records by bitgrit (Tokyo) are on I&T issue 13 (closes 30 October); audit scheduled

Add principal verification to the group's deliverables

In the Capability Map and the Gap Analysis, add principal verification as a checkout step between authorisation and payment:

1	An accountable principal exists	at a stated assurance level; identity stays hidden
2	Bound to one request	short-lived, tied to the merchant and the policy; useless to anyone else
3	Revocation with a declared bound	time to the first refusal, per path, stated and measured

According to the Reference Architecture draft of the AAIF Identity & Trust WG, §5: "A relying party must be able to verify that such a principal exists, at a stated assurance level, without necessarily learning who it is." (our suggestion, adopted by its editors on 14 October). Open source, Apache-2.0: gitlab.com/mintid/mintid · mintid.net · First product built on MintID: ZadQ, zadq.info